Source file state.ml

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350
351
352
(* Defines all high-level datatypes for the TLS library. It is opaque to clients
 of this library, and only used from within the library. *)

open Core
open Mirage_crypto

type hmac_key = string

(* initialisation vector style, depending on TLS version *)
type iv_mode =
  | Iv of string  (* traditional CBC (reusing last cipherblock) *)
  | Random_iv        (* TLS 1.1 and higher explicit IV (we use random) *)

type 'k cbc_cipher    = (module Block.CBC with type key = 'k)
type 'k cbc_state = {
  cipher         : 'k cbc_cipher ;
  cipher_secret  : 'k ;
  iv_mode        : iv_mode ;
  hmac           : Digestif.hash' ;
  hmac_secret    : hmac_key
}

type nonce = string

type 'k aead_cipher = (module AEAD with type key = 'k)
type 'k aead_state = {
  cipher         : 'k aead_cipher ;
  cipher_secret  : 'k ;
  nonce          : nonce ;
  explicit_nonce : bool ; (* RFC 7905: no explicit nonce, instead TLS 1.3 construction is adapted *)

}

(* state of a symmetric cipher *)
type cipher_st =
  | CBC    : 'k cbc_state -> cipher_st
  | AEAD   : 'k aead_state -> cipher_st

(* context of a TLS connection (both in and out has each one of these) *)
type crypto_context = {
  sequence  : int64 ; (* sequence number *)
  cipher_st : cipher_st ; (* cipher state *)
}
(* the raw handshake log we need to carry around *)
type hs_log = string list

type dh_secret = [
  | `Finite_field of Mirage_crypto_pk.Dh.secret
  | `P256 of Mirage_crypto_ec.P256.Dh.secret
  | `P384 of Mirage_crypto_ec.P384.Dh.secret
  | `P521 of Mirage_crypto_ec.P521.Dh.secret
  | `X25519 of Mirage_crypto_ec.X25519.secret
]

(* a collection of client and server verify bytes for renegotiation *)
type reneg_params = string * string

type common_session_data = {
  server_random          : string ; (* 32 bytes random from the server hello *)
  client_random          : string ; (* 32 bytes random from the client hello *)
  peer_certificate_chain : X509.Certificate.t list ;
  peer_certificate       : X509.Certificate.t option ;
  trust_anchor           : X509.Certificate.t option ;
  received_certificates  : X509.Certificate.t list ;
  own_certificate        : X509.Certificate.t list ;
  own_private_key        : X509.Private_key.t option ;
  own_name               : [`host] Domain_name.t option ;
  client_auth            : bool ;
  master_secret          : master_secret ;
  alpn_protocol          : string option ; (* selected alpn protocol after handshake *)
}

type session_data = {
  common_session_data    : common_session_data ;
  client_version         : tls_any_version ; (* version in client hello (needed in RSA client key exchange) *)
  ciphersuite            : Ciphersuite.ciphersuite ;
  group                  : group option ;
  renegotiation          : reneg_params ; (* renegotiation data *)
  session_id             : string ;
  extended_ms            : bool ;
  tls_unique             : string ;
}

(* state machine of the server *)
type server_handshake_state =
  | AwaitClientHello (* initial state *)
  | AwaitClientHelloRenegotiate
  | AwaitClientCertificate_RSA of session_data * hs_log
  | AwaitClientCertificate_DHE of session_data * dh_secret * hs_log
  | AwaitClientKeyExchange_RSA of session_data * hs_log (* server hello done is sent, and RSA key exchange used, waiting for a client key exchange message *)
  | AwaitClientKeyExchange_DHE of session_data * dh_secret * hs_log (* server hello done is sent, and DHE_RSA key exchange used, waiting for client key exchange *)
  | AwaitClientCertificateVerify of session_data * crypto_context * crypto_context * hs_log
  | AwaitClientChangeCipherSpec of session_data * crypto_context * crypto_context * hs_log (* client key exchange received, next should be change cipher spec *)
  | AwaitClientChangeCipherSpecResume of session_data * crypto_context * string * hs_log (* resumption: next should be change cipher spec *)
  | AwaitClientFinished of session_data * hs_log (* change cipher spec received, next should be the finished including a hmac over all handshake packets *)
  | AwaitClientFinishedResume of session_data * string * hs_log (* change cipher spec received, next should be the finished including a hmac over all handshake packets *)
  | Established (* handshake successfully completed *)

(* state machine of the client *)
type client_handshake_state =
  | ClientInitial (* initial state *)
  | AwaitServerHello of client_hello * (group * dh_secret) list * hs_log (* client hello is sent, handshake_params are half-filled *)
  | AwaitServerHelloRenegotiate of session_data * client_hello * hs_log (* client hello is sent, handshake_params are half-filled *)
  | AwaitCertificate_RSA of session_data * hs_log (* certificate expected with RSA key exchange *)
  | AwaitCertificate_DHE of session_data * hs_log (* certificate expected with DHE key exchange *)
  | AwaitServerKeyExchange_DHE of session_data * hs_log (* server key exchange expected with DHE *)
  | AwaitCertificateRequestOrServerHelloDone of session_data * string * string * hs_log (* server hello done expected, client key exchange and premastersecret are ready *)
  | AwaitServerHelloDone of session_data * signature_algorithm list option * string * string * hs_log (* server hello done expected, client key exchange and premastersecret are ready *)
  | AwaitServerChangeCipherSpec of session_data * crypto_context * string * hs_log (* change cipher spec expected *)
  | AwaitServerChangeCipherSpecResume of session_data * crypto_context * crypto_context * hs_log (* change cipher spec expected *)
  | AwaitServerFinished of session_data * string * hs_log (* finished expected with a hmac over all handshake packets *)
  | AwaitServerFinishedResume of session_data * hs_log (* finished expected with a hmac over all handshake packets *)
  | Established (* handshake successfully completed *)

type kdf = {
  secret : string ;
  cipher : Ciphersuite.ciphersuite13 ;
  hash : Digestif.hash' ;
}

(* TODO needs log of CH..CF for post-handshake auth *)
(* TODO drop master_secret!? *)
type session_data13 = {
  common_session_data13  : common_session_data ;
  ciphersuite13          : Ciphersuite.ciphersuite13 ;
  master_secret          : kdf ;
  exporter_master_secret : string ;
  resumption_secret      : string ;
  state                  : epoch_state ;
  resumed                : bool ;
  client_app_secret      : string ;
  server_app_secret      : string ;
}

type client13_handshake_state =
  | AwaitServerHello13 of client_hello * (group * dh_secret) list * string (* this is for CH1 ~> HRR ~> CH2 <~ WAIT SH *)
  | AwaitServerEncryptedExtensions13 of session_data13 * string * string * string
  | AwaitServerCertificateRequestOrCertificate13 of session_data13 * string * string * string
  | AwaitServerCertificate13 of session_data13 * string * string * signature_algorithm list option * string
  | AwaitServerCertificateVerify13 of session_data13 * string * string * signature_algorithm list option * string
  | AwaitServerFinished13 of session_data13 * string * string * signature_algorithm list option * string
  | Established13

type server13_handshake_state =
  | AwaitClientHelloHRR13 (* if we sent out HRR (also to-be-used for tls13-only) *)
  | AwaitClientCertificate13 of session_data13 * string * crypto_context * session_ticket option * string
  | AwaitClientCertificateVerify13 of session_data13 * string * crypto_context * session_ticket option * string
  | AwaitClientFinished13 of string * crypto_context * session_ticket option * string
  | AwaitEndOfEarlyData13 of string * crypto_context * crypto_context * session_ticket option * string
  | Established13

type handshake_machina_state =
  | Client of client_handshake_state
  | Server of server_handshake_state
  | Client13 of client13_handshake_state
  | Server13 of server13_handshake_state

(* state during a handshake, used in the handlers *)
type handshake_state = {
  session          : [ `TLS of session_data | `TLS13 of session_data13 ] list ;
  protocol_version : tls_version ;
  early_data_left  : int32 ;
  machina          : handshake_machina_state ; (* state machine state *)
  config           : Config.config ; (* given config *)
  hs_fragment      : string ; (* handshake messages can be fragmented, leftover from before *)
}

(* connection state: initially None, after handshake a crypto context *)
type crypto_state = crypto_context option

(* record consisting of a content type and a byte vector *)
type record = Packet.content_type * string

(* response returned by a handler *)
type rec_resp = [
  | `Change_enc of crypto_context (* either instruction to change the encryptor to the given one *)
  | `Change_dec of crypto_context (* either change the decryptor to the given one *)
  | `Record     of record (* or a record which should be sent out *)
]

(* return type of handshake handlers *)
type handshake_return = handshake_state * rec_resp list

(* Top level state, encapsulating the entire session. *)
type state = {
  handshake : handshake_state ; (* the current handshake state *)
  decryptor : crypto_state ; (* the current decryption state *)
  encryptor : crypto_state ; (* the current encryption state *)
  fragment  : string ; (* the leftover fragment from TCP fragmentation *)
  read_closed : bool ;
  write_closed : bool ;
}

type error = [
  | `AuthenticationFailure of X509.Validation.validation_error
  | `NoConfiguredCiphersuite of Ciphersuite.ciphersuite list
  | `NoConfiguredVersions of tls_version list
  | `NoConfiguredSignatureAlgorithm of signature_algorithm list
  | `NoMatchingCertificateFound of string
  | `CouldntSelectCertificate
]

let pp_error ppf = function
  | `AuthenticationFailure v ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "authentication failure: %a" X509.Validation.pp_validation_error v
  | `NoConfiguredCiphersuite cs ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "no configured ciphersuite: %a"
      Fmt.(list ~sep:(any ", ") Ciphersuite.pp_ciphersuite) cs
  | `NoConfiguredVersions vs ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "no configured version: %a"
      Fmt.(list ~sep:(any ", ") pp_tls_version) vs
  | `NoConfiguredSignatureAlgorithm sas ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "no configure signature algorithm: %a"
      Fmt.(list ~sep:(any ", ") pp_signature_algorithm) sas
  | `NoMatchingCertificateFound host ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "no matching certificate found for %s" host
  | `CouldntSelectCertificate -> Fmt.string ppf "couldn't select certificate"

type fatal = [
  | `Protocol_version of [
      | `None_supported of tls_any_version list
      | `Unknown_record of int * int
      | `Bad_record of tls_any_version
    ]
  | `Unexpected of [
      | `Content_type of int
      | `Message of string
      | `Handshake of tls_handshake
    ]
  | `Decode of string
  | `Handshake of [
      | `Message of string
      | `Fragments
      | `BadDH of string
      | `BadECDH of Mirage_crypto_ec.error
    ]
  | `Bad_certificate of string
  | `Missing_extension of string
  | `Bad_mac
  | `Record_overflow of int
  | `Unsupported_extension
  | `Inappropriate_fallback
  | `No_application_protocol
]

let pp_protocol_version ppf = function
  | `None_supported vs ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "none supported, client provided %a"
      Fmt.(list ~sep:(any ", ") pp_tls_any_version) vs
  | `Unknown_record (maj, min) ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "unknown record version %u.%u" maj min
  | `Bad_record v ->
    Fmt.pf ppf "bad record version %a" pp_tls_any_version v

let pp_unexpected ppf = function
  | `Content_type c -> Fmt.pf ppf "content type %u" c
  | `Message msg -> Fmt.string ppf msg
  | `Handshake hs -> Fmt.pf ppf "handshake %a" pp_handshake hs

let pp_handshake_error ppf = function
  | `Message msg -> Fmt.string ppf msg
  | `Fragments -> Fmt.string ppf "fragments are not empty"
  | `BadDH msg -> Fmt.pf ppf "bad DH %s" msg
  | `BadECDH e -> Fmt.pf ppf "bad ECDH %a" Mirage_crypto_ec.pp_error e

let pp_fatal ppf = function
  | `Protocol_version e -> Fmt.pf ppf "version error: %a" pp_protocol_version e
  | `Unexpected p -> Fmt.pf ppf "unexpected: %a" pp_unexpected p
  | `Decode msg -> Fmt.pf ppf "decode error: %s" msg
  | `Handshake h -> Fmt.pf ppf "handshake error: %a" pp_handshake_error h
  | `Bad_certificate msg -> Fmt.pf ppf "bad certificate: %s" msg
  | `Missing_extension msg -> Fmt.pf ppf "missing extension: %s" msg
  | `Bad_mac -> Fmt.string ppf "MAC mismatch"
  | `Record_overflow n -> Fmt.pf ppf "record overflow %u" n
  | `Unsupported_extension -> Fmt.string ppf "unsupported extension"
  | `Inappropriate_fallback -> Fmt.string ppf "inappropriate fallback"
  | `No_application_protocol -> Fmt.string ppf "no application protocol"

type failure = [
  | `Error of error
  | `Fatal of fatal
  | `Alert of Packet.alert_type
]

let pp_failure ppf = function
  | `Error e -> pp_error ppf e
  | `Fatal f -> pp_fatal ppf f
  | `Alert a -> Fmt.pf ppf "alert %s" (Packet.alert_type_to_string a)

let common_data_to_epoch common is_server peer_name =
  let own_random, peer_random =
    if is_server then
      common.server_random, common.client_random
    else
      common.client_random, common.server_random
  in
  let epoch : epoch_data =
    { side                   = if is_server then `Server else `Client ;
      state                  = `Established ;
      protocol_version       = `TLS_1_0 ;
      ciphersuite            = `DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA ;
      peer_random ;
      peer_certificate       = common.peer_certificate ;
      peer_certificate_chain = common.peer_certificate_chain ;
      peer_name ;
      trust_anchor           = common.trust_anchor ;
      own_random ;
      own_certificate        = common.own_certificate ;
      own_private_key        = common.own_private_key ;
      own_name               = common.own_name ;
      received_certificates  = common.received_certificates ;
      master_secret          = common.master_secret ;
      exporter_master_secret = "" ;
      alpn_protocol          = common.alpn_protocol ;
      session_id             = "" ;
      extended_ms            = false ;
      tls_unique             = None ;
    } in
  epoch

let epoch_of_session server peer_name protocol_version = function
  | `TLS (session : session_data) ->
    let epoch = common_data_to_epoch session.common_session_data server peer_name in
    {
      epoch with
      protocol_version       = protocol_version ;
      ciphersuite            = session.ciphersuite ;
      session_id             = session.session_id ;
      extended_ms            = session.extended_ms ;
      tls_unique             = Some session.tls_unique ;
    }
  | `TLS13 (session : session_data13) ->
    let epoch : epoch_data = common_data_to_epoch session.common_session_data13 server peer_name in
    {
      epoch with
      protocol_version       = protocol_version ;
      ciphersuite            = (session.ciphersuite13 :> Ciphersuite.ciphersuite) ;
      extended_ms            = true ; (* RFC 8446, Appendix D, last paragraph *)
      state                  = session.state ;
      exporter_master_secret = session.exporter_master_secret ;
    }

let epoch_of_hs hs =
  let server =
    match hs.machina with
    | Client _ | Client13 _ -> false
    | Server _ | Server13 _ -> true
  and peer_name = Config.(hs.config.peer_name)
  in
  match hs.session with
  | []           -> None
  | session :: _ -> Some (epoch_of_session server peer_name hs.protocol_version session)